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Abstract The naturalistic approach to metaethics is sometimes identified with a
supervenience theory relating moral properties to underlying descriptive properties, thereby
securing the possibility of objective knowledge in morality as in chemistry. I reject this
approach along with the purely anthropological approach which leads to an objectionable
form of relativism. There is no single method for arriving at moral objectivity any more than
there is a single method that has taken us from alchemy to modern chemistry. Rather, there is
an ensemble of (cognitive) instruments, techniques, experiments and observations that con-
tribute to eliminating moral error, delivering what we are entitled to call greater objectivity.
Keywords Moral naturalism .Moral objectivity . Relativism .Moral progress . Moral
epistemology. Evolutionary ethics . Is-ought problem . Altruism
‘Moral naturalism’ is sometimes characterised as the view that there are objective moral facts
and properties which are at the same time elements of the natural world (Copp 2007: 2–3). On
some popular versions of this view (Smith 2004; Jackson and Pettit 1996), moral properties
supervene on nonevaluative properties. For example, the properties of ‘cruelty’ ‘wrongness’
and ‘not to be done-ness’ might be said to supervene on the action of whipping a whimpering
dog. In all possible worlds, the claim is, the moral properties of an action, event, person or
situation will be present whenever the action, event, situation or person has the descriptive
properties that it does, just as wherever there is H2O there will be water. By this means the
objectivity of moral judgements is allegedly secured; it is not a matter of our preference or
decision that some liquid is water or not; this depends entirely on whether it is H2O or not, and
the latter is assuredly not a matter of our preferences or decisions.
Such accounts have long-recognised defects. The supervenience concept is strained for
there is general agreement on what liquids are water; but scientific investigation revealed its
hidden substructure long after people had confidently talked about that liquid. With ‘cruelty’
it’s the other way around: there will be general agreement over what is ‘descriptively’
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happening when a beaten dog is whimpering; its evaluative properties are open to theoretical
discussion. Intellectual enquiry in moral theory might appear to be dedicated to trying to figure
out the underlying descriptive properties of, for example, a ‘just war’ or a ‘humane diet,’ but
this process is really aimed at discovering the extension of these terms, whereas the investi-
gation of water’s chemical properties is not aimed at discovering the actual extension of the
term ‘water.’
Other moral naturalists maintain that moral properties are ‘secondary qualities’ like colour
(McDowell 1988); they are ‘detected’ and may be said to supervene on certain configurations
of surface reflectances, light, eyes and brains. Although they are ‘response-dependent,’
secondary qualities are on this view not subjective, for some colour judgements are just
erroneous. That this tomato is red can be objectively true, said of sometomato, and moral
error is seen under this scheme as analogous to colour blindness or perception under disturbed
conditions. But how did we develop the test for normal moral perception?
These versions of moral naturalism are inherently metaphysical, and in view of the
difficulties with the available analogies, they are best regarded as capturing something of the
phenomenology of moral experience; it feels as though we directly perceive the cruelty in the
treatment of the whimpering dog and it seems as though by intellectual effort we could
discover the underlying features of just wars and humane diets.
Another way to think of moral naturalism is as a repudiation of metaphysics which makes
no pretence at saving moral objectivity. From the non-metaphysical, that is to say, biological,
anthropological and sociological perspectives, moralities are simply local practices of interac-
tion between persons relating to the harms and benefits they can do one another that are
endorsed or repudiated by individuals and communities. The practices correspond to
beliefs and the judgements that express them and are linked to perceptual and
emotional experiences (Harman 1977; Prinz 2007). Moral codes are particularly
concerned with prohibitions on sex and aggression, and with duties and privileges
with regard to to kin, superiors, and inferiors. Although there is universal human
agreement that these matters are candidates for regulation and sanctioning for in-
fringement of the rules, there is disagreement as to what the rules ought to be, over
whether individuals have infringed the rules, and there are changes over time of
attitudes and practices.
Moral prohibitions and permissions have analogues in the behaviour of other social animals
that have evolved by natural selection. Sharon Street poses a ‘Darwinian dilemma’ in this
connection (Street 2006). She departs from the premise that either we possess moral intuitions
that we cannot trust, insofar as we recognise that they are produced in brains manufactured by
selfish genes whose interest is in getting themselves into the next generation; or else natural
selection has somehow ‘favoured ancestors who were able to grasp’ what she terms ‘inde-
pendent’ moral truths. So we may be led to fictionalist analyses (Joyce 2002), according to
which the underlying anthropology, biology, and sociology of moral discourse and practice is
truth-apt, but moral discourse itself implicates a fictional world of fictitious facts and fictitious
qualities. Our emotions and reactions are real on this view; our instructional and coercive
practices are actual and concrete, but what we argue and legislate about is completely unreal.
According to E.O. Wilson and Michael Ruse, morality is an illusion that our genes use ‘to get
us to behave’ (1985). And for Ruse (2006), ‘an important part of the moral experience is that
we objectify our substantive ethics.’
From the anti-metaphysical naturalistic perspective, it seems that moral beliefs and practices
can be described and evaluated, but that evaluation can only be relative to a chosen local
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framework. This position is articulated by Jesse Prinz, who offers a subject-relativised analysis
of the notion of moral truth, and by Street who offers an analogously subject-relativised
characterisation of the right thing for an individual to do in the circumstances with which they
are presented. I will first explain these views as I understand them, but then suggest how to
think of moral objectivity in the absence of truth-conditions for moral claims. For, as I believe
these two philosophers effectively show us, we can have either truth conditions or objectivity
as it is understood by the metaphysical wing of moral naturalism, but not both.
1 I
According to Prinz, ‘To believe that something is morally wrong (right) is to have a
sentiment of disapprobation (approbation) towards it. ‘(2006, 33). His updated version
of moral sentimentalism in The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007) is scientif-
ically impressive: It is anthropologically wide-ranging, based on familiarity with actual
practices and beliefs of numerous human groups, past and present. It is also neuro-
logically informed, based on plausible accounts of the cerebral mechanisms involved
in moral judgements. In his semantics for moral propositions, moral judgments
nominally reflect beliefs but in fact express sentiments.
As he explains it, a moral judgement is indexical. (2007, 199).’ Like the statement ‘I
am hungry,’ it cannot be assigned a truth value until we have identified the referent of
‘I.’ The first statement, or the belief it expresses, is true in case the person uttering it or
thinking it is in fact hungry and false otherwise. The moral judgement ‘Desecration of
dead bodies is wrong’ when said (thought) by A is true on Prinz’s account iff desecration
of dead bodies is the type of action that tends to produce in A the sentiment of moral
revulsion. Can A’s thought or statement be erroneous? Yes: If I say, for example, ‘George
is dishonest’ when in fact George has not done anything of a type to arouse in me a
sentiment of disapprobation, I have said something false. But if the Aztecs had a policy
of killing and eating captives, those Aztecs who believed of eligible captives that they
ought to be killed and eaten did not believe anything false (2007, 195–6). Note that
Prinz’s semantics, like Blackburn’s earlier version of expressivism (1984) does not imply
that killing and eating captives is morally permissible. Were I to say so, I would say
something false, for the thought of the action in fact arouses sentiments of disapprobation
in me and I identify with a group that has a policy against killing and eating captives.
Street’s analysis of moral judgements in her essay on normative reasons (2008) is
similarly based on the notion that we cannot get outside an individual’s or group’s
framework of beliefs. She defends an antirealist but ‘coherentist’ account of truth, arguing
that normative judgements are true for A if they are consistent with the whole set of
judgements A would make, or attitudes A would hold if forced to reflect on the
consistency of their values, hopes and plans, where A is some individual or some group.
Summarising, on both accounts, statements about what ought to or may or may not be
done must be considered as asserted or thought by individuals or representatives of
groups or as evaluable only with individuated value-sets. However, neither account
implies that what’s ‘true for them’ has to be endorsed by me as ‘acceptable practice
for them,’ even if not for me. ‘All practices are permissible’ is a general formula that can
have no assertor-independent truth value; its truth value depends on the emotional
dispositions or value set of whoever is thinking that.
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This is, however, a somewhat puzzling result. Consider an Aztec who has anticipated
Prinz’s analysis and who is aware that moral beliefs differ all over the world. The Aztec says.
‘It’s not morally permissible for most people to kill and eat their neighbours, but it is
permissible for me.’ Or the Sierra Leone mother who says ‘It’s obligatory for me to have
my daughters circumcised, but it’s not even permissible for most mothers around the world.’
These judgements do not seem to reflect what we mean by ‘morally permissible’ or
‘obligatory.’ Street’s claim, in turn, that what an agent ought to do needs assessment from
within her value system has a distinguished precedent in Bernard Williams’s insistence on
the exclusivity of ‘internal reasons’ (Williams 1981). However, the analysis worked out in
connection with self-regarding practical reasoning looks problematic when applied to
moral reasoning. ‘Alex’s’ decision whether or not to smoke clearly ought to depend on
nothing more than his values and priorities and on statistics he ought to know about, as
Street persuasively argues. But Sally’s decision whether or not to take money and stamps
from the secretary’s desk when the latter is out for coffee, ought to depend on more than
the features of Sally’s value set. Both Prinz and Street will respond that in ‘our’ system it
is perhaps not permissible for her to do so, on account of our values, but then what is
added to the supposition that Sally decides to steal the stamps and money and believes
this to be permissible, by making her judgement true or justified in her framework?
There are no formal inconsistencies in these accounts, and they both present an important
idea: namely, that we must construct and so improve our belief systems ‘from the inside.’ But
even while we avoid spurious metaphysics and gain integration with anthropology and
psychology, we seem to have lost something that made moral knowledge seekable and worth
seeking and its absence shameful or blameworthy. The question is, how can we use the
insights provided by evolutionary and anthropological accounts of the origins and diversity of
moral beliefs, emotions, perceptions, and practices, whilst defending the notion that some
moral judgements are better than others in as objective a sense as possible?
Why does objectivity matter? In the natural sciences, confidence in the objectivity
of a theorem or equation or causal statement gives us the assurance that it is safe to
interfere with reality on its basis: to build the bridge, or prescribe the drug. In moral
theory, objectivity matters because knowledge that we are doing the right thing –if we
can get it–can give us confidence that we are avoiding moral harm to others, even in
circumstances in which our actions produce pain or resentment, and confidence that
criticism, interference, and on occasion resistance to other people’s wishes and
disregard for their preferences are justified. Objectivity justifies us in expressing
resentment, outrage, moral alarm, and sometimes in retaliating or intervening rather
than being tolerant and adopting a policy of to each his own.
Prinz recognises that we need some account of ‘betterness’ relations in moral belief sets. In
two later chapters he discusses human practices and institutions that tend to arouse disgust or
disapprobation and that come in for moral criticism by us 21st C.westerners: namely canni-
balism, incest, and polygyny. He suggests that learning about the history and anthropology of
these institutions may change our sentiments towards them towards a less condemnatory
stance. Although, in his words, ‘Moral progress cannot be interpreted as a transition from
one set of values to a morally better set of values,’ we can make make ‘progress that is not
illusory,’ by seeking ‘moral values that are better in an extramoral sense’ (2007, 297). One set
of beliefs and practices is better than a competitor if it is not only more consistent, he thinks,
but performs better on other criteria, such as reduced social tension, welfare and well-being,
generality and universality, and consistency with biological norms (2007, 292). Thus internal
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coherence, logical consistency, and the satisfaction of external criteria are regarded by Street
and Prinz as tests for the relative goodness or acceptability of moral claims.
2 Ii
Huw Price (2011) has recently argued that naturalism need not look for an account of how the
statements of problematic discourses, including moral discourse, can fit the facts in the way the
statements of the natural sciences have been supposed to do so. Instead, he suggests, following
Rorty and other pragmatists, we should give up the notion that the statements of natural
science mirror mind-and culture-independent reality and are therefore paradigmatically truth-
apt. Instead, we should look to how all our discourses function, how they are connected to our
practices, and how they are put to use, especially in argumentation.
If we take this insight seriously, we can be liberated not only from both an unhappy
relativism, and from awkward metaphysical theories of moral objectivity such as
supervenience theory, but also from futile searches for criteria for moral truth. Rather than
trying to state truth conditions for moral claims, including conditions articulated from an
internalist perspective, we can make an entirely different kind of appeal to the sciences of
nature, including the sciences of human nature, studying actual episodes of indisputable moral
progress and understanding how they came about. Nonevaluative biological, ethnographic and
psychological data, along with other sources of information, have a role to play here. Contrary
to the cliché that you can’t derive ought from is, our ‘oughts’ invariably rest upon ises, without
being logically deducible from them. I will say more about this later in the paper.
Meanwhile, in adopting the naturalistic stance in moral theory, we can consider three
distinct areas of research into the nonevaluative grounding of the evaluative. The first is the
Darwinian level in which the evolutionary origins of morality in nonhuman animals are
studied and modelled with a special focus on our closest non-human relatives amongst the
primates. Darwin’s own observations and speculations in The Descent of Man (1871) were
pioneering in this respect. The second is the anthropological level in which the specific cross-
cultural features of human cognitive and emotional architecture that are relevant to morality are
studied. The third is the cultural level in which we can examine belief change in ethics, the
practices that discourage it or encourage it, and come to understand why, in particular cases,
one belief or practice came to be accepted as better than its predecessor. In the same way that
basic animal learning about the environment is succeeded and corrected by specifically human
forms of learning involving imitation, teaching, symbolic representation and communication,
and these universal forms were succeeded in turn by specialised methods such as looking
underneath the appearances with special instruments, or employing statistical methods, the
variety of original forms of moral discourse and practice in humans and other animals are
extended and corrected by forms of human learning and these in turn are refined in techno-
logically complex societies with developed forms of communication. At each level there are
continuities and corrections.
The importance of the study of the evolutionary origins of morality for understanding moral
objectivity is that it reveals to us the ubiquity and simultaneity of competition, conflict, and co-
operation, also exploitation and protection. We have learned a great about the ways in which
social animals monitor one another’s behaviour, are aware of individual personalities and
temperaments, and practice deception, avoidance, and assistance, in highly context dependent
ways. The distinction between genes and their vehicles (Dawkins 1976) the organisms whose
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behaviour and morphology enables them to get into the next generation, explains why
organisms formed by natural selection are never fully selfish in the vernacular sense, and
instead can exhibit generosity, awareness of others’ needs and feelings and responsiveness to
them to the point of self-sacrifice.
Customarily the evolutionary origins of altruism are explained by biologists in game
theoretic terms, imagining individuals playing different strategies of selfishness, altruism and
reciprocity. These simulations revealed that a selfish strategy quickly dominates if introduced
as a mutation into a population of altruists; that an altruistic mutation cannot dominate if
introduced into a population of selfish individuals, but that a cautious strategy of ‘grudging’ tit-
for-tat, behaving altruistically towards all individuals at first encounter, but then selfishly
unless reciprocated could succeed (Dawkins 1976, 166–8). As Kitcher points out, however, for
these models to be relevant to the human case there would have to have been some point in our
evolutionary history ‘at which primates, great apes or early humans were forced into pairwise
interactions of form of an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma’ (Kitcher 2006, 160). Nor are
such models helpful in understanding the evolution of symbiotic relationships such as that
described by Trivers (1971) between the wrasse and the cleaner fish. So the question how can
animals evolve to perform complex, costly actions cannot be answered in this way. But one
might as well be puzzled as to how we evolved eyes. For the animals that have them, eyes are
essential to survival and reproduction. But it is costly to build a visual system; the right genes
have to produce the right optical and cortical architecture. So we look for small steps along the
way, beginning with the evolution of cells that respond to light and with mechanisms for
moving in response to the information and for gradual improvements to systems that can
exploit the information in the electromagnetic properties of things to a greater and great degree.
Ancestral cleaner fish that dared to come ever closer, ever more frequently to an ancestral
wrasse’s mouth must occasionally have met infested ancestral wrasse that were more tolerant
than others. Selection on each type produced ever braver and ever more tolerant fish.
Tooby and Cosmides (1996) argue that animals’ reinforcing and extinguishing reactions to
low-cost, unintentionally provided benefits and harms are the small steps that will enhance or
diminish the probability that they are performed in animals that experience social learning.
Suppose, for example, I toss my half-eaten apple over my shoulder and you, starving, pick it
up. You respond with gratitude and groom me. I become more likely deliberately to toss food
your way and my gratitude behaviour is reinforced. Accidental harms when retaliated against
can also develop considerate habits. Suppose I toss my half-eaten apple over my shoulder and
it hits you in the eye, impairing your fitness. You deliver a punishment in the form of a lunge at
me, impairing mine. Eventually deliberately harmful behaviour as well as thoughtlessly
inconsiderate behaviour is moderated. My carelessness is deterred and I am spared future
punishment and you keep your other eye. The ‘Baldwin effect,’ according to which traits that
are first produced only under conditions of specific environmental triggers or stresses later
show up across a range of conditions, is helpful in understanding these evolutionary processes
(Ananth 2005).
Moving to the second level, we can ask what innovations in human emotional and cognitive
architecture make the distinctive features of human morality as opposed to that of other social
animals, especially the primates, possible. Here we should focus on such features as language,
long childhood, post-reproductive longevity, the explicit awareness of complex kinship rela-
tions, and food sharing. Apes may eat communally and respond to begging, but the practice of
hunter-gatherers of collecting food, bringing it home, and distributing it to the less or
nonproductive adult members of the group as well is exclusively human. Conceptions of
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fairness, entitlement, and compassion have to be present to regulate this process. Further,
humans engage in co-operative labour and intellectual effort in the manufacture of boats, food
preparation, preparation for festivals, the planning of hunts and battles. Laziness is discouraged
and punished, talent and insight are valued and rewarded. Conceptions of obligation to others,
and pulling one’s weight are needed to underpin this, as well as a reduction in irritability and a
willingness to reconcile with former enemies (de Waal 1996, 2006). Finally, the human mating
system diverges strongly from that of chimpanzees and bonobos, featuring as it does long-
lasting pairbonds, but with covert adultery, and complex emotions of jealousy, guilt, furtive
attraction, and loyalty. Politically, although humans, like other animals, are inclined to defer to
dominant individuals, there is a ‘preference for equality’ (Boehm et al. 1993) in hunter-
gatherer groups under a critical size. Persons perceived as troublesome and aggressive may
be assassinated or driven out of the group.
Tooby and Cosmides (1996) point to the development of individual personalities and
competencies –the ‘appetite for individuality’ as highly significant in making people
valuable to one another and ensuring their loyalty and help in times of need. A person
has good reason to make themself irreplaceable by others by developing specialised skills
and by cultivating ‘deep engagement’ with persons they in turn find irreplaceable. The
importance of personality can explain many features of our altruism that reciprocal
altruism and kin selection leave mysterious. Why do we feel duty bound to look after
our aging parents when they are not going to produce more copies of our genes? Why do
we feel duty bound to follow our leaders into war when we are going to get killed and
produce no offspring at all? Why do we lavish our love and attention to men or women
who will never give us any more children or even help us with the ones we already
have? Our knowledge that we are irreplaceable to our parents, our long experience of
their beneficence and uniqueness, create memories and expectations of benefits. People’s
tendency to remain in troubled relationships is evidence that, contrary to the old song, it’s
worse to be alone on the shelf than it is to be in love by yourself.
Because biology underdetermines behaviour even in nonhuman primates, which develop
different local customs, we can expect diversity that sometimes reflects the environmental
conditions faced by a geographically dispersed species that gets its food in different ways
and the contingencies of its technology and relations with other groups. However, it also
reflects gradual drift, spontaneous innovation, or sudden conversion into forms of cultural
practice which differ as much as costumes and rituals. Peaceful and warlike tribes may
differ little in their modes of subsistence or technologies or environmental constraints but
profoundly in their cultural values and ideals. (Robarchek and Robarchek 1992). The result
is the observed variety of systems especially concerning kinship obligations, sexual behav-
iour, and aggression against insiders and outsiders that characterise human groups. What
they have in common are rules, whose effect is to render the social world more predictable
and to reduce the need for stressful monitoring of other individuals (Gibbard 1990, 55–82;
Kitcher 2006). Groups that adopt conventions, rituals, and moral rules cannot and do not
need to encode them in the genes; they can be transmitted and maintained by social
learning and sanctioning. They facilitate co-operative activities and reduce the costs of
social interaction. Religious ideation was probably essential to this process of archaic code
promulgation, as it implies retaliation by divinities or the cosmos even for unseen infrac-
tions. The alternation of fear of violating norms, including taboos, and ceremonies of
worship and propitiation, with gratitude for one’s continued existence and its enjoyments
provides the emotional substructure for conformity.
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The third level on which morality can be studied as a phenomenon is as a set of beliefs,
attitudes and practices that are subject to criticism and change in nonliterate as well as literate
societies. Before going on to address moral change as a dynamic process, a brief character-
isation of morally significant situations and actions is called for.
Moral problems and dilemmas also arise because we feel the pull of some possible
sacrifice such as making sizable donations to charity but at the same time want to satisfy
our own desires for entertainment, mental and physical exercise, and adornment. Moral
argument sometimes recommends such sacrifices or the adoption of some burdens for the
greater good. Sometimes, it denies that sacrifices are necessary or burdens are appropriate.
Moral change occurs when new burdens are identified and deemed relevant to practices, or
when the balance of burdens and benefits is recalculated. In technologically sophisticated
societies, a wealth of new devices for gathering and interpreting information, for assessing
burdens and benefits is available, and for comparing the effects of policies becomes
available. The alternative ways of behaving or of organising one’s society become clearer.
Discussion and argument take information and the structures for analysing it from old beliefs
and practices into new ones. In describing the Amazonian Waorani’s abandonment of warfare
after generations of vendettas that the tribespeople themselves could not see how to arrest,
the Robarchek and Robarchek (1992) argue that the pattern changed when ‘new cultural
knowledge—new information and new perceptions of reality –allowed the formulation of
new individual and cultural values and goals’ (p. 207). One might point out that not all such
conversions are morally progressive. But the reason a ‘conversion’ to fascism and genocide
could not constitute moral progress is that the new values and goals acquired could not be
founded in empirical reality; the readjustment of benefits and burdens could not be based on
a more accurate assessment of people’s actual and reasonable wants and needs.
3 Iii
The problem of moral objectivity is insoluble if it is approached by asking what properties have
to be added to beliefs, or subjective values, or moral emotions or attitudes to qualify them as
knowledge. Knowledge, it is sometimes said, is justified true belief not arrived at by wayward
means: very well, but this formula does not help us to understand how an individual or a group
or a society goes about acquiring knowledge, or losing or forgetting what they knew.
Imagine some alchemists meeting together in the fifteenth century. They have beliefs about
the malign and beneficial influence of the stars, about the signatures of plants, and the efficacy
of certain herbal tinctures when the herbs have been gathered by the light of the moon. They
believe opium induces dreams and drowsiness andmercury cures syphilis. They begin to worry
about whether their beliefs are actually true. Suppose they ask themselves, what would have to
be added to our beliefs to make them true? Alas, there is nothing, from their perspective, that
could be added. They can’t anticipate the developments in instruments, techniques and theory
that will lead to the rejection of some but not all of their beliefs. From our retrospective
standpoint we can distinguish between the beliefs that are true and that aren’t, and we can give
an account of the history of chemistry that explains how rejection and acceptance came about.
Sympathetic historiography can elucidate why the alchemists believed what they did and
explain why many others have been subtracted from the corpus of knowledge.
Getting-to-know required the discovery or invention of entirely new methods of collecting
information about stars and herbs and making a ‘vexed’ nature communicate her secrets. It
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also depended on ignoring certain time honoured beliefs and impressions of obviousness or
plausibility. New methods of physical and quantitative analysis came into play. The invention
of the printing press made the collation and organisation of data effective and efficient and
stimulated processes of verification and criticism. We ‘learned how to learn’ about the
properties of stars and herbs (See Mizrahi 2013).
In the same way, if Aristotle had asked himself what had to be added to his belief that
slavery was in some cases just to make it the case that he knew that slavery was in some cases
just, he could only have given the trivial answers that his belief would need to ‘correspond to
the facts’ and ‘be justified by appropriate arguments and considerations.’ If we agree that the
claim that slavery is wrong has the same degree of objectivity as the claim that the stars do not
have a malign influence on human affairs, we can treat both discoveries as the end points of
gradual processes of getting-to-know. We learned how to learn about morality, subtracting
beliefs and altering conceptions as well as adding them. Unanticipated, unforeseeable methods
of conceptual analysis, notably the utilitarian calculus and Kantian logic, combined with
knowledge gathered from slave narratives and eyewitness descriptions of slavery. There is a
narrative of knowledge acquisition—perhaps even several rival narratives–that can explain
how we, the descendants of slaveholders, came to reject the practice. Analogous narratives can
be supplied for the abandonment of routine torture, public hangings, burnings at the stake, the
recognition of the rights of women, protective labour legislation, social security, animal
welfare, and other instances of moral progress. As in the case of scientific progress, we may
be able to envision what would constitute improvement in some domain concerned with sex,
aggression, reciprocity, or duties to kin and others, but how or why the improvement came
about is a story that can only be told after it does come about (Wilson 2010). Although Prinz is
right to point to ‘generality’ as characterizing many notable instances of moral progress: we
might think here of the extension of voting rights to the working classes andthe abandonment
of clerical and aristocratic privileges, again, if there were any parameter on which an increase
guaranteed an improvement in our views, we would not ever need to remain undecided on an
issue, and we could scrutinize our existing beliefs to see if they were as general as possible.
If I declare a practice to be objectively wrong, I think there was or could be a narrative that
would explain why we could get to this conclusion, and that there can be no reasonable
narrative that will take us back from it. Logically, I know, there could be, just as logically it is
imaginable that some series of experiments leads us back to phlogiston from oxygen. A retreat
from the moral truth could also happen as a result of the loss of learning, the suppression of
information, the banning of rational enquiry. But how theory and experience, rationally and
responsively to observation, would lead us back to phlogiston is unimaginable. I can imagine
that we return to slavery, torture, the claustration of women in the next century, but only as the
result of the loss of information, and the control of knowledge and politics by a malevolent
elite. In neither case does my conviction imply that I am trapped behind the veil of belief,
anymore than the oxygen theorist is trapped in their commitment to standard chemistry. Truth
is what we get to by employing discipline-specific procedures (Wilson 2011). And we should
distinguish between positions that people may be passionately committed to such as vegetar-
ianism or pacifism or abortion and positions that are truly terminal points of enquiry. On these
topics, as on euthanasia, the jury is still out as far as our culture is concerned.
There are a number of objections to this view:
First, it might be argued that the theory is elitist. It puts the truth in the hands of the educated
classes who have read their Plato, Bentham, Mill, and Kant and have some familiarity with the
history of institutions. They are a minority of the human race; why should what they regard as
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instances of progress—moral truths discovered– be identified with the objectively true?
Second, it might be argued that we accept correspondingly elite views in the natural sciences
because they prove their status in practice by allowing for prediction and control, which moral
truths do not do. Third, it might be argued that the objectivity of personal moral knowledge is
not explained by the existence of historical narratives. Fourth, it will be argued that slavery was
always wrong, and would always have been wrong, whether or not human processes of enquiry
ever arrived at that result.
To the first objection, it can be replied that the discovery of noncommonsensical
truths is always in the first instance in the hands of an elite; to the second objection,
one might propose that moral progress relieves social tensions, diminishing the amount
of ill-will in a society and the presentation of grievances (Railton 1986). It has to be
conceded nevertheless that societies do not deliberately test moral claims in this
fashion. To the third objection, it can be pointed out that if, objectively speaking, it
is wrong to take stamps and money from the secretary’s desk when he is out to lunch,
there is no special moral argument that would lead one who denied this to conclude (in
the typical case) that it was really permissible. And to the fourth objection, the reply is
that the things that are true are the things we know. Combustion most certainly
involved oxygen before we knew it, but it is meaningless to say that it was true before
we knew it.
Finally, it will be argued that it might be the case that vegetarianism is morally obligatory
though we never get to the point of acknowledging this as a moral truth. I simply deny the
claim, unless it is interpreted as the claim that we will some day discover this to be true but the
discovery will be somehow suppressed.
4 Iv
The Darwinian dilemma would threaten all our knowledge if we were unable to take a
critical perspective on our evolutionarily-implanted intuitions and if we had to accept a
realist account of the existence of facts independent of knowledge-generating
procedures.
The solution I have proposed requires us to identify, confidently, instances of undisputed
moral progress and to understand each as having a distinctive narrative of discovery that may
run parallel to other narratives. But this point does not address the question how the biological,
ethnographic, and psychological discoveries of the last century may have a role to play in
advancing moral knowledge. ‘Is’ can never lead to ‘ought,’ is a plaintive refrain not only of the
philosophers but of the biologists themselves.
Strictly speaking this is false. No ought- statement logically follows from a set of is-
statements, but we constantly make these inferences. For example:
When people become inebriated they are tired, emotional and poorly co-ordinated.
To fly a passenger plane safely without crashing, it is essential to be alert, calm, and co-
ordinated
Pilots should not fly passenger planes when inebriated.
This is an important normative conclusion. As a general rule (subject to exceptions) it
qualifies as objective. The argument leading to it is a good one, but only because first, the
factual premises are true; second, there is a suppressed normative premise –that it is bad to
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crash planes—that is a safe assumption; and third, because no reason has been presented for
why we ought to make an exception in some particular case, concluding that an inebriated pilot
ought to be permitted or required to fly a plane. (If, for example, there is some chance of
escaping a fate worse than death for the passengers.)
Accordingly, the way is open for making good arguments about what ought to happen
based on true factual premises drawn from the human sciences, provided the additional
normative premises they depend on are safe assumptions; and provided there are no reasons
to make an exception. Such arguments are however always vulnerable. For first, some factual
premises reflect how things are now, but not how they must be; second, our conception of what
a safe normative assumption is can change; and third, new reasons for making exceptions can
appear at any time. Consider for example the following argument which appeared flawless to
past generations:
Argument 1
Mothers have a strong preference not to be separated from their infants for more than a
few hours at a time.
The lucrative and visible professions require long hours spent in adult company
Therefore, mothers of infants do not belong in the lucrative and visible positions.
Today we might argue:
Argument 2
Mothers have a strong preference not to be separated from their infants for more than a
few hours at a time.
The lucrative and visible professions require long hours spent in adult company
Therefore, the workplaces and time allocations in the lucrative and visible professions
ought to be restructured.
Argument 1, which depends on the generally agreed normative premise that women should
not be made unhappy, is nevertheless vulnerable to the presentation of an ‘except that’ reason.
In this case, it is that the exclusion of women from the visible and lucrative positions is anti-
meritocratic and does not permit the development and exercise of women’s capabilities.
Argument 2 depends on the same general premise that people should not be made unhappy,
but it is vulnerable to a different presentation of an ‘except that’ reason. In this case, it is that it
would be too troublesome and costly to restructure the working day andworkplace facilities. As
we are beginning to see an evolution away from Argument 1 towards acceptance of Argument
2, we may have the intimation that the workplace will be restructured to a greater degree in the
future and that this will constitute moral progress. The narrative of how this comes about will
involve reference to court cases, editorials, personal narratives, and philosophy articles.
The new human sciences, including evolutionary psychology, endeavour to distinguish
between preferences, tendencies, and capabilities that are less influenced by social learning and
by contingent social arrangements and those that are more malleable, and between those that
are malleable without inducing suffering and those that are not. They look for unconscious as
well as conscious motives relevant to survival, reproduction, and the furtherance of the
interests of kin and kith that can explain social behaviour. In any case in which they present
us with a well-established conclusion, for example than people vary in traits relevant to their
potential to earn large sums, or that men are more sexually aggressive and less selective than
women, there will be two opposing arguments ready to be formulated. One will be an
argument for indulging or tolerating a preference or tendency on the part of one party even
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if it is to the disadvantage of another party; the other will be an argument for repressive
measures undertaken ‘against nature,’ seen as a repository of disorderly forces needing to be
tamed (Mill 1904; Huxley 2004) in order to protect the interests of the other party affected by
the preference or tendency.
Other things being equal, it is inefficient, ineffectual and frustrating to devise social policies
that go against people’s preferences, tendencies, and reactive attitudes. Our institutions should
respect what we are biologically speaking, ingenious, outdoorsy, kin-focussed, sexually
curious. As the foregoing makes clear, there can be no direct, uncontroversial ‘arguments
from nature,’ that can establish certain practices and policies as morally better than others.
Nevertheless, empirical research can undermine essentialisms, the typically binary classifica-
tion systems humans use, and the stereotypes that enable them to make quick social judge-
ments. We discover that the species is polymorphic in many dimensions; people differ
significantly in terms of ambitiousness, promiscuity, altruism, empathy, sexual identity, and
so on, and that although differences in emotions and competencies between men and women
are real, their magnitude and significance is exaggerated in our socio-economic systems.
Behaviour is flexible and opportunistic; 'mating strategies' in humans are not fixed routines
but conditional on personalities and circumstances (Gangestad and Simpson 2000).
At the same time, small differences in preferences can unleash major moral and social
problems. In the environment of early adaptation, for example, both sexes were vulnerable to
frustration of their immediate interests on account of the preferences of the other. Men endured
rejection and women were pestered. The power relations of the modern workplace have both
upset the equilibrium, making it more difficult to escape pestering and exercise rejection and
rendering any decision taken by the woman more likely to damage than to advance her career.
To devise remedies, we need first to accept the fact that reproductive strategies are amenable to
but also resistant to re-education, that male and female reproductive strategies, underwritten by
cognitive and emotional mechanisms, conflict to some extent, and that individuals vary in their
levels of educability. By seeing male sexual solicitation, for example, as normal and frequent
rather than as unusual and perverse behaviour, recognising at the same time that it is seriously
deleterious to the interests of young working women, we can clear away some of the clouds of
confusion surrounding this issue.
Second, the human sciences can demystify certain forms of authority, hierarchy, and group
behaviour. If we come to see participation in modern warfare as a human version of participa-
tion in chimpanzee raiding parties, and as underwritten by emotional structures that make it
fulfilling for many who participate in it (Wrangham and Petersen 1996; Liddell Hart 1933), we
will cease to regard it as a glorious means of determining whose cause is just and see it
instead as the irrational atavism it really is. If we come to understand magic and religion, the
belief in unseen personalities exercising powerful causal influences and to some degree able to
be placated by human behaviour, as adaptations appearing in human cognitive architecture that
made human social life and its modes of subsistence possible (Atran and Norenzayan 2004;
Hocart 1970), we will not dismiss either as foolish nonsense, but rather try to convert the
emotional power at least of the latter to constructive rather than destructive enterprises.
To summarise, the potential objectivity of moral beliefs can be understood within a
naturalistic framework by considering moral truth as the outcome of diachronic processes of
enquiry resulting in belief-change for the better. Taking up a scientific perspective on human
cognition, emotion, and behaviour contributes to the process of belief-improvement by
supplanting folk wisdom. There are, however, no set criteria by which two opposing moral
beliefs can be directly compared to see which one is correct. As with the experimental
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sciences, we can recognise the superiority of the later view only by coming to appreciate the
narratively unique critical process by which it emerged from the inferior alternative. To be
rationally, as opposed to merely fideistically convinced that a moral belief is true though as yet
unknown to be so is to believe that it could emerge from an inferior alternative by a unique
critical process bearing some similarity to the critical processes that showed us that slavery,
torture, the restriction of voting rights and occupations, cruelty to animals, and aristocratic
privilege were objectively morally wrong.
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